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BAR BRIEFS

istration of justice can be improved, the economic machinery oiled a
bit, the world made a little better as we go along.
And so, as soon as I have mailed this screed to the Secretary, I am
going up to my garden to admire the delphiniums.
-JOHN
H. LEwis, President.

JURY TRIALS
Continuing the article by John H. Wigmore, of which the May
issue carried items i and 2, covering Demerits Erroneously Imputed
to Jury Trial, and Demerits Non-inherent in Jury Trial, and the June
issue the three items of Demerits Inherent in Jury Trial but Remediable, Demerits Alleged but not True in Fact, and Demerits Inherent
and not Remediable, this issue takes up the sixth item, under the
head of:
Merits
Supposing that all the remediable demerits be cleared away, and
jury trial be revised to its utmost inherent efficiency, the question
will still remain, "Is it superior to judge trial ?"
The writer believes that it is, in that it possesses four merits that
can never be possessed by judge trial. The first two of the four are
so vital, yet so seldom appreciated, that they will here be emphasized.
i. Prevention of Popular Distrust of Official Justice: Most
political revolutions have had either their origin or their touch-off in
some phase of the administration of justice. The Peter Zenger trial
for seditious libel in New York in the 1700's, James Otis' speech
against general warrants in Massachusetts, the Seven Bishops' trial
in London, the Boston Massacre, the Dred Scott case, John Brown's
hanging-all the way back in our annals we see these notable landmarks. And this is because the legislative law, as well as the common law, gets enforced through the courts, and not by the legislatures
themselves.
Hence, the popular attitude toward the administration of justice
should be one of respect and confidence. Bureaucratic, purely official
justice, can never receive such confidence. The one way to secure
it is to give the citizen-body itself a share in the administration of
justice. And that is what jury trial does. And judge trial would
never do it.
In the Civil War of 1861-65 the military draft broke down, for a
main reason, because it was conducted by Federal military officers
sent out into the towns and villages; they came as strangers, with
uniformed independent State authority. In the World War of 1917-18
this error was avoided. The draft was administered by 4,5oo boards
of three men each, chosen from the very locality on recommendation
of the mayor. They were given no uniform (though several were
thoughtless enough to ask for it) ; they had no soldiers and no bailiffs;
they were just respectable fellow-citizens. The draft was a complete

BAR BRIEFS

success, because it was not bureaucratic and the citizens themselves
supplied temporarily the investigating personnel.
Jury trial has the same political significance.
Moreover, it may be predicted (so vital is this necessity) that if
we were to shift to judge trial, the demand for popular election and
short terms of judges would be so extreme and so irresistible that we
should end by sovietizing and degrading our Bench precisely as Russia
has done. And in Greece, where this was done, the consequences were
ruinous.
In short, jury trial has won inherent superiority over judge trial,
in supplying the necessary political share of the citizenry in daily
justice, with the least loss of efficiency.
2. Provision for Necessary Flexibility in Legal Rules:
Law
and Justice are from time to time inevitably in conflict. That is because law is a general rule (even the stated exceptions to the rules
are general exceptions) ; while justice is the fairness of this precise
case under all its circumstances. And as a rule of law only takes
account of broadly typical conditions, and is aimed on average results,
law and justice every so often do nqt coincide.

Everybody knows this, and can supply instances. But the trouble
is that Law cannot concede it. Law-the rule-must be enforced
-the exact terms of the rule, justice or no justice. "All persons are
equal before the Law"; this solemn injunction, in large letters, is
painted on the wall over the judge's bench in every Italian court.
So that the judge must apply the law as he finds it alike tor all.
And not even the general exceptions that the Law itself may concede
will enable the judge to get down to the justice of the particular case,
in extreme instances. The whole basis of our general confidence in
the judge rests on our experience that we can rely on him for the law
as it is.
But, this being so, the repeated instances of hardship and injustice
that are bound to occur in the judge's rulings will in the long run
injure that same public confidence in justice, and bring odium on the
law. We want justice, and we think we are going to get it through
"the Law," and when we do not, we blame "the Law."
Now, this is where the jury comes in. The jury, in the privacy
of its retirement, adjusts the general rule of law to the justice of the
particular case. Thus the odium of inflexible rules of law is avoided,
and popular satisfaction is preserved.
Every lawyer can supply instances, but here is a recent one that
goes right to the point. It is based on the authority of the eminent
handwriting expert who testified. A certain young woman, who was
earning her-own living, had been beguiled into marrying an attractive
man, who turned out to be a worthless sot, incapable of supporting her.
He settled down to live off her earnings; she was giving him some
$75 or $8o a month. After "enduring this life for two years or so,
she secured a divorce. He died not long after. Meanwhile, however,
he had managed to insure his life for $2,ooo in his own favor, paying
the first premium only. Left penniless as she was by this good-for-
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nothing, her friends persuaded her to file a claim against the estate
for the amount of her advances to him. Otherwise the insurance fund
would go to an uncle, living at a distance. At the trial, a promissory
note turned up, signed by the quondam husband in favor of his wife,
for just the amount of her advances. Its genuineness was disputed.
The handwriting expert was obliged to state in his testimony that the
note was a plain forgery. But the jury brought in a verdict for the
woman for the amount of the note. Afterwards, the expert respectfully asked the foreman whether the jury had doubted the expert's
testimony that the note was a forgery. "Forgery?" replied the foreman, "Sure we believed it was a forgery; but we were not going to let
that poor woman lose all the money that she had given to that worthless
husband of hers !"

That is what jury trial does. It supplies that flexibility of legal
rules which is essential to justice and popular contentment.
And that flexibility could never be given by judge trial. The judge
(as in a chancery case) must write out his opinion, declaring the law
and the findings of fact. He cannot in this public record deviate one
jot from those requirements. The jury, and the secrecy of the jury
room, are the indispensable elements in popular justice.
There is a good analogy, which must be cited even at the risk of
laboring the point:
The cable-car system of San Francisco carries the cars up the
steepest hills, on a gradient of 50 or 6o degrees. But the underground
moving steel cable must at all times and places be taut, so that the carclutch can grip it accurately. Nevertheless, any cable will stretch or
contract, even a steel one--partly because of weather changes, partly
because of differences of weight when more or fewer cars are on the
same hill. How to meet this problem, viz., of taking up or letting out
the slack? The inventors successfully solved it thus: At the terminal,
at the bottom of the hill, it built a deep broad cavern, containing a
huge, heavy revolving drum; this drum is on a broad platform, and
the platform is on wheels, capable of sliding forward or backward,
on tracks, for ioO feet or so. The cable, coming to the foot of the
hill, runs into this cavern and around the drum. As the cable stretches
and becomes slack, this drum slides back, thus taking up the slack.
As the cable contracts again, the drum slides forward, thus yielding
and preventing a break of the cable. Without the flexibility furnished
by the drum, the cable system would be impracticable.
Jury trial is the underground cable-drum of the Law.
3. Education of the Citizenry in Administration of Law: In a
democracy, where the operation of the law frequently becomes a political issue, it is important that the body of citizens should have a general acquaintance- with court methods. They must not be a mystery.
Mere publicity of trials does not effect this; for only the casual witnesses and the idle or curious now form the audience of a court room
(except in certain rural regions). But jury-duty will bring all respectable citizens sooner or later to have acquaintance with court
methods, and in such a way as to compel serious thought and give the
needed scrap of judiciary education common to all.
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With judge-trial, nothing of the kind takes place. Even the
publicity of trial does not produce its modicum of effect; compare
the attendance before a master or referee and the attendance at the
humblest jury-court.
4. Improved Quality of a Verdict Based on Reconciliation of
Varied Temperaments and Minds: This element is something distinct from the capacity to judge testimony (Demerits 3). Ask any
twelve intelligent friends, some evening at your house, any question of
opinion or fact, calling for serious thought-a question of politics,
business, morals, health, science, recreation, or what you like. Will
it ever happen that you do not glean from at least two or three of the
twelve some argument or detail or judgment that the others (if they
were agreed) had failed to mention?
Science is based (in spite of Einstein) on exact absolute realities.
But the conduct of human life has to be based on elusive averages or
generalities, whether in politics, law, medicine, engineering, commerce
or ethics. And when it comes to applying these generalities to concrete
cases, the only safe machinery that is dependable in the long run, is a
machinery that embodies an average judgment, i. e., the reconciliation
of several judgments taken at random. (Ed.-Note this point, judge
whether it is true in your own estimation, and if true whether true
only with relation to jury-trial.)
Look at our universities. Did any Faculty ever suppose that a
student's final standing could be best rated by any single professor,
however wise? No, it is best ascertained by the net result of twenty
or more judgments.
And, for that matter, look at our Supreme Courts. The law is
supposed to be definite and definable. But was there ever a supreme
court that was given less than three members? And do they not now
commonly number seven and nine members? And is there not frequently a divided court? If we need a variety of minds to give us, in
the long run, the most dependable judgments on supposedly definite
rules of law, how much more do we need a variety of minds to give
us dependable judgments on indefinite masses of facts?
The bench-court of three persons is the least that would be permissible in judge-trial. But, apart from the doubt whether this number is enough, the full value of three minds would rarely be obtained.
The reason is that if we should adopt (and we would have to) the
method used in all other countries, i. e., of using one senior judge and
two junior or apprentice judges as assessors, we should find (human
nature attests it) that the juniors, with an eye on promotion, would
usually take their cue from the senior. In short, we should not usually
get the value of more than one mind and a half. The proper approach,
therefore, to the trial of jury trial is, first to analyze the demerits of
jury trial, inquiring as to their actual existence in time, place, and
subject, and noting Wihether they are remediable by regulation, law,
or constitutional amendment; and then, having eliminated the demerits, to compare the inherent merits of jury-trial with the corresponding qualities of judge-trial.
And, incidentally, this would certainly involve sending a commission (twelve would be best) to continental Europe, for at least a year's
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sojourn, to study their experience with judge-trial.

It is just barely

within the range of possibility that the continental bar could reveal
some grounds of dissatisfaction with judge-trial!
In short, let us see whether our American Watch can be repaired,
and whether, if repaired, it will still be inferior to that Swiss Watch.
REVIEW OF NORTH DAKOTA DECISIONS
Bolton vs. Wells: Plaintiff, an osteopath by profession, was
riding with defendant, upon invitation, to attend a meeting of a service
club in another town, both being members of the organization. While
driving at a speed of 35 to 40 miles an hour, over more or less icy
roads, defendant turned his head to speak to some one in the rear seat.
At that moment the car swerved, then skidded into a ditch and turned
over. Plaintiff received severe injuries, permanent in nature, incapacitating him from practice of his profession, as to which there
is no dispute. Jury returned a verdict for $7,ooo. HELD: This was
not a joint enterprise. Plaintiff was guest of defendant. The jury's
determination of defendant's negligence is controlling. Plaintiff did
not assume the risk of the car skidding and overturning, and the theory
that mistake of judgment in an emergency does not constitute negligence can not be invoked where defendant's negligence creates the
emergency. Knapp vs. Gibbs, 277 S. W. 259, is quoted: "A person
may not operate a car at an excessive and unlawful speed so as to
prevent its reasonable control in an emergency and then be permitted
to say, after the emergency arose, that he did all he reasonably could
with the means at his command to avoid the injury."
Rode et al vs. Highway Commission: Proceeding to enjoin construction of highway, and involves Chapter 159 of 1927 Session Laws.
Late in 1927 the county commissioners of Ward county made application to the Highway Commission and to the U. S. Bureau of Public
Works for certain road construction, and also spent moneys for survey
and acquiring right of way. The plan was approved. The Highway
Department relocated and redesignated certain parts of the road. This
was approved by the county commissioners with certain provisos relating to the original location "or the road through the village of Douglas"
which was not referred to in the original location. The county budget
provided for the original location, but not for the one as changed.
Trial Court determined injunction should issue if the county was to be
charged for part of the improvement, otherwise not. Both sides appealed. HELD: The Highway Department has full power to locate
and relocate roads. Determination of the wisdom of such selection is
not for the courts. Action of the commissioners is unnecessary for
location of a road, only to provide the county's share of the expense.
By pledging the county's share of the cost, the county consented to
the change of location. "Whether it is necessary to have the Board
of County Commissioners adopt a new resolution every time a slight
change is made in the location of the highway or whether after the
road in general is routed and agreed to by the County changes may be
made by the Department without consulting the County" is not
determined.

